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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher Michael Foote appeals from his judgment of conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine, arguing that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The facts, as found by the district court, are as follows: 
On February 13th of 2012, in Bingham County, Idaho, dispatch was 
advised by a landlord who's been identified as Mr. Ely that he was 
concerned with a tenant and a disturbance going on in the apartment, and 
he was concerned, apparently, about something happening to the 
apartment. 
Dispatch contacts Officer Adrignola, who responds with Officer 
lnfanger and Corporal Wheatley. At least they arrive at approximately the 
same time, and they make contact with the landlord, Mr. Ely. And Mr. Ely 
takes them into his home and directs them to where the defendant's 
apartment is. And in doing so, he takes them through his house, the 
landlord's house, through the kitchen, which has a door that adjoins the 
stairwell and the garage, described in Exhibit A submitted here today. 
In looking at Exhibit A, looking at that document, the defendant has 
outlined a rectangular home, outlined his apartment which is upstairs, has 
drawn on there what appears to be a sidewalk to a door on the right side 
of that diagram and towards the bottom of that diagram in the right-hand 
corner. He indicates that that's a door that people come to when they 
come to visit him and that it remains locked. 
However, the garage is Mr. Ely's, which connects to the stairwell, 
which connects to the kitchen, which the defendant explained was to the 
left of that stairwell, being the kitchen of the landlord. 
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This Court finds that that area is basically a common area. At least 
it belongs to Mr. Ely, and he has the authority to allow people into that 
area. 
When you go up the stairs, then there's a makeshift door. 
This Court finds that the officers did, after being shown where the 
apartment was, go up those stairs and knocked on the door, and the 
defendant opened the door at that point. 
The officers, in getting there, were checking and investigating the 
disturbance. The officer indicated they were doing a welfare check. And 
they indicated that, when they knocked on the door, that contact-initial 
contact was very short. They asked the defendant to come downstairs. 
During that short period of time, the officer did note the defendant looked a 
little disheveled, was disoriented, and was sweating. 
When they asked him to come downstairs, rather than coming 
downstairs, he put his hand in his pocket and turned back into the 
apartment. There's no indication, other than the defendant's own 
testimony, that he went outside that apartment door at the top of those 
stairs. 
In fact, he says, when the officers got there, he was coming down 
the stairs. And, quite frankly, this Court thinks that's-puts more weight 
on the officer's testimony. I think it's more credible in this case. 
But at the same time, I think that even makes a stronger position for 
the initial question, when this defendant remains upstairs in his apartment, 
never steps out, turns around, putting his hand in his pocket, and going 
back into-or deeper into his apartment. 
The officer, being concerned for his safety based upon that 
movement of putting his hand in his pocket, follows him in. And within a 
short distance the defendant removes a pipe and puts it into the drawer. 
The officer observes that pipe and knows, from his training and 
experience, that it is a marijuana pipe and sees a lightbulb [sic] within the 
dresser drawer as well consistent with one used for smoking 
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methamphetamine. The defendant closes the drawer, at which the officer 
promptly opens the drawer and places those on top of the dresser. 
They then place Mr. Foote in a chair and then begin to question 
him. After a certain point in time, he gives them consent to search the rest 
of the apartment. 
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.68, L.6 - p.71, L.7.) 
The state charged Foote with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.57-58.) 
Foote moved to suppress the evidence found in his apartment, asserting that officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the apartment "without consent, probable 
cause, or a warrant." (R., pp.78-79.) The district court held a hearing on the motion 
(5/16/2012 Tr.; see also R., pp.109-10), and after taking the matter under advisement, 
subsequently denied the suppression motion (5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13; 
see also R., p.112). 
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, wherein Foote reserved the right to 
appeal the denial of his suppression motion, Foote pleaded guilty. (See R., pp.183-84, 
207.) The district court entered judgment against Foote and imposed a suspended 
sentence of six years with two years fixed, and placed Foote on probation for a period of 
five years. (R., pp.231-33.) Foote filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.237-38.) 
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ISSUE 
Foote states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Foote's motion to suppress 
and finding that law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into Mr. Foote's 
apartment was justified? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 





Foote Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence 
Introduction 
Below, Foote filed a motion to suppress evidence found in his apartment arguing 
that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his apartment "without 
consent, probable cause, or a warrant." (R., pp.78-79.) The district court denied the 
motion, holding that the officers' entry was justified by the exigent circumstances of 
officer safety and protecting Foote from himself. (5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, L.19- p.13, L.13; 
see also R., p.112.) On appeal, Foote argues that the district court's ruling was in error. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-12.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this 
case, however, supports the district court's order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P .2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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C. Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless Entry Into Foote's Apartment 
The issue in this case was whether the circumstances officers encountered 
justified their warrantless entry into Foote's apartment. The Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer's warrantless entry into a residence is presumptively 
unreasonable unless it falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 218 (Ct. App. 2003); 
State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 849, 41 P.3d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
One such exception occurs when the "exigencies of the situation" make the 
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 
(1978). Under this exigent circumstances exception, "a warrantless intrusion may be 
justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the 
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other 
persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted). A court evaluating a claim that exigent 
circumstances justified a warrantless home entry should determine whether the facts 
known to the police, with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would "warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate. 
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P .3d at 278. 
The reasonableness of the belief that an exigency exists is determined by the 
totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the entry. State v. 
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Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 711, 662 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Ct. App. 1983). While courts 
must scrutinize a claim of emergency to ensure that it is not a mere pretext for entries 
and searches that otherwise would require a warrant, courts should avoid second-
guessing police decisions made in legitimate belief that life may very well be at stake. 
Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 850, 41 P.3d at 278. "The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Therefore, reasonableness "must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight." kl 
The district court determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the 
officers' entrance into Foote's apartment was justified by their reasonable belief that the 
situation they faced with Foote created the exigencies of protecting themselves and 
others, and protecting Foote from himself. (5/18/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.19-25.) The 
underlying facts of this case involved the officers responding to an unknown situation, 
intending to perform a welfare check due to Foote's out of control behavior. (5/16/2012 
Tr., p.10, Ls.12-19; p.69, Ls.18-20.) Foote had been tearing apart his apartment and 
yelling about missing some medication, causing concern to his landlord, Mr. Ely. 
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-15.) Police made contact with Foote at "a little after midnight." 
(5/16/2012 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.9.) Foote looked disoriented, was "sweating quite a 
bit," and appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (5/16/2012 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.6-9; p.26, L.15 - p.27, L.2.) Foote would not come out of the apartment to speak to 
the police. (5/16/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-24.) Instead Foote made a "furtive" movement 
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by grabbing his pocket, told the officers to "hold on a second," and, leaving the door 
open, retreated deeper into the apartment. (5/16/2012 Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.1; 
5/18/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3.) 
The district court determined that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in 
Ryburn v. Huff,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012), presented an analogous case. In 
that case, officers learned of a rumor that a student had threatened to "shoot up" his 
school. kL. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 988. The officers decided to investigate the threat by 
contacting the student at his house. kL. After officers knocked on the door without 
response and called home and cell phone numbers, the student ultimately came outside 
with his mother to talk to the police. kL. The officers wanted to discuss the matter 
indoors, but the mother refused. kL. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 988-89. The officers asked if 
there were guns in the house. kL. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 989. The mother responded by 
immediately turning around and running into the house. !st Concerned for officer 
safety, the officers followed. kL. 
The Supreme Court recognized that its jurisprudence reasonably led to the 
conclusion that "the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence if the 
officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of 
violence." kL. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 990. The district court in Ryburn, based on the 
totality of the circumstances the officers confronted, determined that the officers had an 
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was a threat of imminent violence, 
"particularly since the situation was 'rapidly evolving,' and the officers had to make quick 
decisions." !st at_, 132 S.Ct. at 990-91. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 
believing, "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and calm deliberation," that the officers' fears 
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were unreasonable because the subjects had only asserted their constitutional rights to 
not speak with the police by retreating into their home. lsL at_, 132 S.Ct. at 991. 
The Supreme Court reversed the panel, holding that, "[j]udged from the proper 
perspective of a reasonable officer forced to make a split-second decision in response 
to a rapidly unfolding chain of events that culminated with [the mother] running into the 
house after refusing to answer a question about guns, [the officers'] belief that entry was 
necessary to avoid injury to themselves or others was imminently reasonable." !st at 
, 132 S.Ct. at 992. 
Under the circumstances of this case, judged at the moment of entry, officers 
could reasonably believe that following Foote into the apartment was the course of 
action best calculated to protect officers and others nearby. The situation was tense, 
with officers responding to an unknown threat late at night. Foote would not come out 
and speak to the officers. He appeared to be under the influence of drugs. He was 
behaving out of control, tearing apart his apartment and causing concern to his landlord, 
Mr. Ely. Under these circumstances, Foote's furtive movement of grabbing his pocket 
could reasonably be interpreted as Foote reaching for a weapon. Foote's retreat 
deeper into his apartment could lead an officer to reasonably infer, in that split-second, 
that whatever weapon Foote sought, he had not found it in his pocket. Following Foote 
into the apartment, in an effort to prevent him from acquiring a weapon, much like in 
Ryburn, furthers the interest of protecting the police and others nearby. This is 
especially true when confronting a subject who appears under the influence and was 
behaving out of control. On the contrary, requiring officers to wait for a violent subject to 
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arm himself before they can take precautionary measures, in order to protect 
themselves and others nearby, does nothing to further the interest of officer safety. 
The exigent circumstance of protecting Foote from himself is also supported by 
applicable case law and the facts found by the district court. In this case, officers were 
not investigating criminal activity; they were responding to a disturbance, attempting to 
perform a welfare check, due to Foote's behavior. Foote was obviously distraught and 
out of control, tearing apart his apartment and yelling about his missing medication. He 
appeared disoriented, disheveled, and under the influence. Foote would not come out 
of his apartment to speak with the police, instead retreating deeper into his apartment 
after grabbing his pocket. Under the totality of these circumstances, it would be 
reasonable to believe that Foote either needed assistance locating his medications 1 or 
that he presented a risk to himself and, if not followed, might harm himself. Forced to 
make a split-second decision in that tense situation, and based on the exigency of 
protecting Foote from himself or at least rendering assistance, officers could reasonably 
conclude that an exigency existed that required them to enter Foote's apartment without 
a warrant. 
Though the district court did not employ it as grounds to justify the officers' 
warrantless entry into Foote's apartment, another possible exigency existed in this case: 
Protecting Mr. Ely's property, the apartment, from further destruction by Foote.2 In the 
case of New York v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976), the Court of Appeals of New 
1 Reviewing Foote's testimony, it appears that the officers actually found his missing 
medications. (See 5/16/2013 Tr., p.43, Ls.6-11.) 
2 Appellate courts will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal 
analysis by applying the correct legal analysis. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 
P.3d 895, 901 (2001). 
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York held that the exigent circumstance exception applies where police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency requires their immediate assistance 
for the protection of life or property. kl at 609 (abrogated on other grounds by Brigham 
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)). Other jurisdictions have adopted this 
expanded exception. See, ~. Massachusetts v. Knowles, 883 N.E.2d 941, 946 
(Mass. 2008) (the emergency exception applies when the police are responding to an 
immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property); New Mexico v. 
Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1044 (N.M. 2005). This exception is "closely related to the 
community caretaking function" and, as with that function, "does not apply when the 
purpose of police action is to gather evidence of criminal activity, rather than to respond 
to an immediate need for protection of life or property." Knowles, 883 N.E.2d at 946. 
Idaho appellate courts have also recognized that police officers do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by taking action consistent with their community caretaking function. 
In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818, 748 P.2d 401, 402 (1988). "The constitutional 
standard in community caretaking function cases is whether intrusive action of police 
was reasonable in view of all surrounding circumstances." State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 
752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (quotation and brackets omitted). "An action is 
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." Brigham City 
at 404 (emphasis original, quotations and brackets omitted). The officer's subjective 
motive is irrelevant. Id. 
Under the facts of this case, entry into the apartment was objectively reasonable 
based on the exigency of protecting Mr. Ely's property. Foote was out of control, tearing 
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apart the apartment. Officers were called to the scene because Mr. Ely, who owned the 
apartment, was concerned based on Foote's behavior that something might happen to 
his property, the apartment. The officers were investigating the public disturbance, not 
investigating a crime. Entering the apartment to prevent further destruction to the 
property is reasonable under those circumstances, regardless of the officers' subjective 
motive for the warrantless entry. 
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, making split-second 
decisions while confronting Foote, who had been tearing apart an apartment while 
yelling about missing medication, and who appeared to be under the influence of drugs, 
in a tense and evolving situation, officers could reasonably conclude that entering 
Foote's apartment without a warrant was necessary for officer safety, to protect Foote 
from himself, or to protect Mr. Ely's property. Because the officers' entry into Foote's 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Foote's motion to suppress evidence. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2013. 
c~ 
R  
Deputy Attorney General 
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